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I. INTRODUCTION
It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default
rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise,
these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek
to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions.1 In settings where
these costs are high, parties might find themselves “stuck” in a
default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer.
The strong version of this account—that the only factor that can
make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a
tailored provision—has been gradually reappraised.2 It is by now
recognized that factors beyond drafting costs might also cause parties
to stick with an undesirable default rule; that is, parties might
choose not to opt out of a legal default even when a better provision
can easily be identified and articulated at a negligible drafting cost.
While this “stickiness” of defaults has been identified before in

* Professors, University of Michigan Law School. We are grateful to Robert Ahdieh,
Amitai Aviram, Phoebe Ellsworth, Franco Ferrari, Mitu Gulati, Robert Scott, Guy Rub,
James J. White, and Frank Yates, as well as participants at the Florida State University
College of Law Symposium on Default Rules in Private and Public Law and the Michigan
faculty seminar for helpful comments. We also thank Mike Murphy, Ali Rabbani, and Ming
Shui for research assistance.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (6th ed. 2003) (“[C]ontract
law cannot readily be used to achieve goals other than efficiency. A ruling that fails to
interpolate the efficient term will not affect future conduct; it will be reversed by the
parties in their subsequent dealings. It will only impose additional—and avoidable—
transaction costs.”). This intuitive proposition was developed in the early work of Goetz
and Scott. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default
Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 94 n.4 (2003) (“[C]hoosing a default rule on the basis of some
normative conception of fairness would be wrong, in the sense that it would not increase
the amount of fair contracts in the world, but it would increase the amount of contracting
costs.”).
2. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 263
(1985).
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discrete contexts,3 the purpose of this Article is to suggest that its
pervasiveness may be even broader than previous accounts have
predicted.
The core intuition is simple. In the presence of a default rule—or,
more precisely, in the presence of a familiar and commonly utilized
background provision, be it a common law doctrine, a business norm,
or a boilerplate contractual term4—a transactor might fear that
proposing an opt-out from the default will dissuade his potential
counterparty from entering into the agreement. The fear is that the
counterparty will suspect that the proposer’s decision to deviate from
the norm and use an unfamiliar provision hides some unknown
problem: in short, that it is a “trick.” The counterparty, seeking to
rationalize why the deviation was proposed, may construct a negative
account and attribute some undesirable reason for the departure by
the proposer. Depending on the plausibility of the imputed negative
account, the counterparty will either exact an offsetting discount or
avoid entering into the contract altogether.
Consider the following example. An author submits her
manuscript to a publisher or a law review. Suppose the common
practice (the “default”) is for her to offer the manuscript on an
exclusive basis. An author who opts out of the practice and offers to
submit to multiple publishers concurrently may be viewed adversely,
and her chances to publish the manuscript might be diminished.
Aside from begrudging the negative direct value of having to compete
against other publishers, a reviewer might make a host of negative
inferences about the author: that she is insecure about the quality
and the appeal of the manuscript, that she disregards editorial norms
and is difficult to work with, perhaps even that the quality of the
manuscript is inferior.
But what if the default is the opposite, and publishers allow and
expect multiple concurrent submissions? How would a publisher view
an author who opts out and offers exclusive submission of a
manuscript? We argue that although there is positive direct value to
avoiding competition with other publishers, a reviewing publisher
might still make a negative inference about the proposal: that the
author is desperate and does not think she can publish the
manuscript elsewhere so is trying gimmicks, that the author is
unpredictable and is difficult to work with, perhaps even that the
study lacks timeliness and so the author sees no urgency to
3. For a discussion of “stickiness” in several contexts, see Jason Scott Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J.
615 (1990).
4. For a discussion of the similarities between these terms, see generally Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757
(1995).
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publication. In short, no matter what the default practice is, a
proposal to opt out of it can raise a host of suspicions. Anticipating
these suspicions, an offeror may adhere to the default and suppress
any desire to deviate or experiment.
Opt-out proposals may differ widely in terms of the direct value to
the offeree. Apart from the associated learning costs,5 a proposed optout can have positive, negative, or neutral “direct value” to the
offeree. That is, some terms may have positive direct value to the
recipient, meaning that, other things being equal, a rational offeree
would pay to have the term included in the contract and adjust the
price favorably. A seller’s proposed warranty of satisfaction would be
such an example. Similarly, it is easy to imagine terms whose direct
value is negative to a recipient, such as a seller’s proposed as is/no
refunds condition. In theory, then, a deviant proposed term should be
rationally priced by the counterparty, with either an upward or
downward adjustment based on direct value.
But when an unfamiliar term is proposed, other things may not be
equal. Due to the unfamiliarity of the term itself, its recipient may
impose an effective penalty in the form of an additional, negative
adjustment. Indeed, a principal claim of this Article is that the
contractual phenomenon we might loosely refer to as “deviance
avoidance” may even apply to proposals which, by the objective direct
value of their content, should be seen as good for the counterparty,
that is, when the departure from the default is genuinely favorable to
the recipient of the proposal.
To be sure, not all default rules and terms are sticky. Many types
of complex transactions are tailored term by term, and in those
settings the content of untailored default rules plays little role.
Stickiness, this Article argues, is more likely to be an impediment to
opt-outs in situations where it is uncommon for other market
participants to negotiate a tailored provision, that is, where the
background rules and templates are well entrenched and commonly
employed.6 Moreover, there are various other forces, apart from the
one discussed here, that can render a default provision sticky, such
as learning effects, network externalities, interpretive risk, and
more.7 The purpose of this Article is neither to unbundle them nor
5. See Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of
Contract-Reading Costs, 1 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y (2001), http://www.bepress.com/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=bejeap.
6. The argument is not that stickiness can be inferred from the existence of
uniformity in the adherence to the background default—this would be a tautology. Rather,
the argument is that the more prevalent the adherence of other contractors to the
background default, the more costly it becomes for a party to propose a deviant term.
7. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997)
(discussing network externalities and learning effects); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory
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rank their importance. It is to suggest that the resulting stickiness
from the combination of these and other forces may be more robust
than often appreciated.
To explore the stickiness of default rules, this Article employs the
following technique. It identifies and examines situations in which
two sets of jurisdictions take opposite approaches with respect to the
default rule they apply to a specific issue of contract law. In these
situations, if the defaults are sufficiently divergent and if we assume
that it is impossible for both default rules to be equally efficient, then
we should expect (as our null hypothesis) that in one set of these
jurisdictions—but not the other—parties will systematically opt out
of the default more prevalently, particularly if the transaction costs
involved are predicted to be low. If, instead, parties stick with the
default in both sets of jurisdictions, regardless of that rule’s content,
then such contracting behavior must indicate the additional costs
associated with deviance avoidance.
The Article focuses on three examples. The first example looks at
the rules governing the revocability of contractual offers. It shows
that there is significant variance across jurisdictions in defining the
right to revoke offers. It also shows that there were important
changes to this doctrine within jurisdictions over time. But there is
no evidence that opting out became more prevalent in one
jurisdiction (or time period) based upon the content of the default
rule regarding revocability. The second example looks at the rules
governing the termination of employment contracts—the at-will
versus for-cause doctrines—and again argues that there is no
evidence of greater incidence of opt-out under one regime versus the
other. Finally, a third example examines the drafting of boilerplate
contracts in a specific sector: bond covenants. It discusses a study
that demonstrates how surprise changes in the substantive legal
interpretation by courts of terms in these contracts did not produce
responsive redrafting.
Part II of this Article reviews the prior accounts of default
stickiness that have developed the intuition underlying this analysis.
Part III discusses the larger phenomenon of stickiness that can be
pieced together with those prior accounts and offers additional
conjecture regarding the mechanisms at work. Part IV presents the
three examples of stickiness of default rules to support the claim that
the problem of stickiness is pervasive. Part V concludes.

Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998)
(interpretive externalities).

2006]

ON THE STICKINESS OF DEFAULT RULES

655

II. PRIOR ACCOUNTS OF STICKINESS
This Article is not the first to identify the stickiness of legal
default rules in contracts, nor is it the first to argue that parties
might sometimes leave contracts “economically incomplete” (that is,
leave some contracts ungoverned by terms that are Pareto optimal),
even when the direct transaction costs of identifying specific
arrangements for some important contingencies are low. For
example, Russell Korobkin conducted a series of experiments
(discussed in more detail below) on first-year law students exploring
whether the psychological phenomenon sometimes known as the
“endowment effect” leads parties to attach disproportionate utility to
legal default rules as the status quo.8 Korobkin hypothesized that the
same cognitive bias that underlies individuals’ preferences for
maintaining the status quo with respect to physical items also
generates a bias for legal defaults.9 If the legal default is perceived as
an entitlement with similar attributes to, say, a coffee mug (the
physical item used in many endowment effect experiments),10 then
individuals will be less inclined to opt out of them. His findings do,
indeed, lend support to the conclusion that human beings are
cognitively disposed to prefer a default legal rule in contractual
negotiations, irrespective of the content of that legal rule.11
Korobkin also ran follow-up studies to probe further the apparent
bias toward the status quo.12 For example, what happens when the
default rule changes? Would status quo preferers seek out the old
default rule (to return to comfortingly familiar territory), or would
they prefer the new default rule (to remain passive in the face of an
opportunity to opt out)?13 The data from his follow-up trials led
Korobkin to conclude that it is the latter, for which he offers a
cognitive bias explanation: the attractive role of inaction in the
service of “regret avoidance” by decisionmakers.14 He calls this
account the “inertia theory.”15
Even if one takes Korobkin’s studies as consistent with a
psychological attachment to default arrangements, the question
8. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 608 (1998).
9. Id. at 611-12.
10. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-7 (2002).
11. See Korobkin, supra note 8, passim.
12. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998).
13. Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 197-99 (disaggregating various
psychological forces that render the status quo attractive).
14. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1621-24.
15. Id. at 1586; see also infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
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remains as to the strength and nature of this effect. Korobkin
examined the preferences of individuals toward a favorable legal
rule. He found that they would demand more to give up the rule
when it was framed as a default legal entitlement than they would
pay to acquire the rule when it was not framed as a default.16 But his
studies that measure abstract pricing preferences when framing is
manipulated may not fully capture the dynamic, interactive nature of
contract negotiation. Consider in this regard the example of a written
proposal in which a default term is crossed out (for example, an offer
presented as a boilerplate contract with a standard clause explicitly
and conspicuously altered and replaced by the opposite
arrangement). Do recipients, following Korobkin’s inertia theory,
prefer to remain passive and avoid regret by accepting the penciledin alteration as proposed by the offeror (as the “framed” status quo)?
Or do they prefer to send back the offer with a counterproposal
reverting to the crossed-out term (returning to the “default” status
quo)? Korobkin’s results tend to suggest that they prefer the latter,17
which strikes us as plausible. We are not sure, however, that this
strategy reflects an exhibition of inertia. Inertia alone, it seems,
cannot fully explain the attraction of default rules.
Taking an economic perspective, Lisa Bernstein offers another
explanation for the attachment of parties to default rules, based on
social norms and negotiation strategy.18 She explores the possibility
that parties form adverse judgments when they encounter proposals
to alter default norms in negotiating contracts.19 She further predicts
that these “costs” to deviate depend upon the type of contract at
issue. They are likely enhanced in situations where repeat
interaction is required over the course of the contractual
relationship:
Relational factors may also affect the cost of contracting around
default rules. In transactional settings where informal norms are
an important part of the parties’ contracting relationship, a party
may be reluctant to suggest varying a particular default rule even
if the “direct transaction costs” are low and the variation would
make both parties better off.20

16. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1621; see also Korobkin, supra note 8, at 637-47.
17. Korobkin, supra note 8, at 637-47; see also infra notes 87-100 and accompanying
text (discussing Korobkin’s findings).
18. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993).
19. See id. at 71-72.
20. Id. at 70. Earlier implicit recognition of this idea appears in Stewart Macaulay’s
work of the 1960s on commercial norms. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963); see also
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465.
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Bernstein believes such costs can be reconciled within the Coasian
framework by arguing that costs (and also benefits) of opt-out cover a
wider sweep than lawyers’ fees. Thus, implicit in Bernstein’s account
is the idea that a party who varies a particular default rule is
regarded by her counterpart as a more likely violator of the informal
cooperative norms that discipline participants’ behavior and the idea
that such a negative perception can be costly. As a consequence,
deviant proposals are shied away from in the negotiation of longterm contracts.21
Taking a similar but more rigorous approach, economist Kathryn
Spier indirectly touches upon the persistence of default contract
terms in her theory regarding why some contracts remain
“economically incomplete.”22 She models formally the signaling
effects of bargaining proposals and demonstrates that uninformed
parties may infer information from the content of a proposal made by
more informed parties. A fear of adverse inferences may lead the
more informed parties to forego proposing potentially surplusenhancing terms when they negotiate their contracts.23
Illustrating her model, Spier uses a stylized example of a
professional athlete negotiating his employment contract with a
sports team.24 Even though the athlete might want an “injury
clause,” that is, a specific provision guaranteeing some minimum
level of compensation in the event of an injury, and even though he
presumably would accept the commensurate downward wage
adjustment that is actuarially appropriate for a wage guarantee
(since he is more risk-averse than the team), he is nevertheless
unlikely to propose such a provision in negotiations. This is because,
predicts Spier, the athlete recognizes that the team may view his
very request to include an injury clause as a signal that he has a
greater than average tendency to become injured. If the team does
read the proposal as such a signal, then it will adjust his wage by
more than the average cost of an injury. Not knowing how injuryprone the athlete truly is due to the costly observability of this
characteristic, but knowing that it is likely known (or at least more
known) by the athlete as private information, the team would
conclude that, other things being equal, it is the more fragile athletes
who tend to benefit from injury clauses. Hence it would suspect that

21. Bernstein speculates that these forces may arise in certain short-term
transactions as well. See Bernstein, supra note 18, at 71 (“Similar barriers to contracting
around default rules are also present even in transactional settings where the parties do
not have long-term business or social relationships and tend to think about the transaction
in terms of their legal rights and duties.”).
22. Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992).
23. Id. at 433.
24. See id.
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those who ask for such clauses are more likely to be fragile, and it
would draw an adverse inference from any such request. Regardless
of the true probability of injury, and regardless of the presumably
superior knowledge the athlete might have both of that probability
and of his personal preference to forgo some wages to gain the
insurance term, surplus-enhancing injury clauses might never get
put on the negotiating table by athletes for fear of the negative
message they could send.25
A similar understanding of the strategic behavior of negotiating
parties is developed in an important article by Jason Johnston.26
Critiquing the idea that default rules should be designed to induce
the revelation of information (the “penalty default” paradigm),27
Johnston notes that strategic considerations in certain circumstances
could make it undesirable for parties to propose deviations from
background legal rules.28 He argues that it could conceivably be a
superior strategy for a party to remain silent and accept a seemingly
inefficient default arrangement, rather than propose a potentially
efficient opt-out, if the very process of opting out effectively requires
the revelation of valuable private information that can be exploited
by the other party. For example, a shipper who highly values safe
carriage of goods might be inclined to contract out of default rules of
limited carrier liability and ask for higher liability coverage. But in
so proposing such a high-insurance opt-out, she would reveal to the
carrier her higher value attached to full performance of the contract
and thus expose herself to having a greater share of her surplus
extracted by the carrier through a price adjustment that would more
than account for the greater liability.29 Facing this expropriation risk,
the shipper might prefer to remain silent and accept the suboptimal

25. See id. Interestingly, injury clauses are apparently the norm in some professional
sports’ collective bargaining agreements (hockey) but not others (football). See Collective
Bargaining Agreement Between the NHL and the NHL Players’ Ass’n, art. 23.4 (June 26,
1997), http://www.nhlpa.com/CBA/PDF/CBA-1997.pdf [hereinafter NHL CBA]; Collective
Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the NFL Players Ass’n, art.
XII, § 2 (Feb. 25, 1998), http://www.nflpa.org/Media/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete#art12
[hereinafter NFL CBA]. The reader is invited to speculate why these different norms might
have developed, which may have to do with the comparative prevalence and seriousness of
injuries. It is possible that NFL players have a greater chance of experiencing major
injuries than NHL players, and this increased risk led to differences in standard contract
norms. In any event, the injury clause norms are mandatory rather than waiveable by
contract, so not amenable to empirical analysis of opting out behavior.
26. See Johnston, supra note 3.
27. See id. at 616; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (introducing
the concept of “penalty defaults”).
28. Johnston, supra note 3, passim.
29. Id. at 617.
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liability coverage; the default arrangement will stick.30 Johnston uses
this example to conclude that strategic behavior in forming contracts
can be influenced by the content of the default rules. In other words,
not only are default rules sticky, but some defaults are stickier than
others.31 Under Johnston’s argument, the limited liability default is
stickier than an unlimited liability default because only with the
former does an opt-out reveal the shipper’s high idiosyncratic value
of performance.32
Johnston’s argument was responded to by Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner, the original proponents of penalty defaults, who concede that
strategic considerations could affect party conduct in moving out of
default positions but disagree with the implication that these
incentives could be asymmetric.33 Proposing an “irrelevance
conjecture,” Ayres and Gertner contend that any signal an informed
party could choose to withhold in negotiating a contract could be
effectively extracted through a screening proposal by the counterparty
to force selection from a fixed menu of terms.34 Therefore, they
conclude, rather than the content of a default rule making some gaps
more inefficient than others due to asymmetric signaling, “those
inefficiencies will be the same regardless of the initial gap filler.”35
Johnston and Ayres & Gertner all agree, however, that strategic
incentives influence contracting behavior in just the same way as
direct transaction costs; all can undermine efficient tailoring.36
Yet another strand of contracts scholarship identifies the
stickiness of default terms and suggests that externalities might be a
cause. In a series of articles, Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan
discuss the network externalities of standard contract provisions that
include “learning” and “networking” benefits.37 Learning benefits are
the advantages that retrospective usage of an entrenched legal term
(through judicial interpretation, legal service familiarity, and so
forth) accord current users.38 These benefits arise wholly apart from
the rule’s intrinsic efficiency. Network benefits are the collective
advantages shared among multiple contemporaneous (and
30. Ayres and Gertner recognized this obstacle to information-forcing opt-outs. See
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 741 (1992) (noting the possibility that contractual
inefficiencies will persist even when contracting is costless and showing that these
inefficiencies arise when the hidden characteristics of the more informed party are
nonverifiable).
31. See Johnston, supra note 3, at 626-27.
32. See id. at 630-31.
33. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 30, at 732-34.
34. See id. at 737-39.
35. Id. at 737.
36. See id.; see also Johnston, supra note 3.
37. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 718-27; Klausner, supra note 4, at 772-825.
38. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 718.
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prospective) users of a term when it is widely proliferated.39 The
quintessential example of such a networking benefit is telephone
technology; a solitary telephone is of limited usefulness, but when
everyone has one they become quite valuable.40 Similarly, a legal
term, dispersed throughout a network, can create externalities—
benefits that may be unrelated to the inherent value of the term
itself (recall that Betamax was supposedly a superior product but
everyone used VHS).41 Kahan and Klausner model under which
conditions these learning and network externalities can distort the
selection of legal rules and lead to suboptimal terms.42 Such
situations provide yet another illustration of when defaults can
become sticky.43
Although these prior analyses offer differing perspectives regarding
the stickiness of default rules, they all examine the same phenomenon.
They each struggle to understand the true and full costs of deviating
from the status quo that parties incur in forming their contracts,
beyond the simple transaction costs of drafting. In the next section,
this Article builds (modestly) upon a subset of these accounts—the
Johnston-Spier-Bernstein signaling theory—to suggest that the scope
of this stickiness problem is potentially broader and more prevalent
than previously perceived.44
III. THE COSTS OF DEVIATING FROM DEFAULT RULES: FEAR OF THE
UNKNOWN?
In situations of contract formation by two arms-length parties,
each actor forms opinions and expectations about the other party and
the value she brings to the transaction through the filters of
incomplete and asymmetric information. Anytime a relationship
involves uncertainty about attributes of the partner, the process of
entering into a contract is affected, and potentially obstructed, by
information the parties infer about one another.
39. See id. at 725-27.
40. See Klausner, supra note 4, at 772.
41. A typical example of these benefits is in insurance industry boilerplate, where
wide proliferation of identical language allows insurance carriers to compare actuarial
data. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006).
42. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 730.
43. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 947 (2004).
44. This survey is not comprehensive. For example, Mark Roe has written about
“semi-strong path dependence” and defaults. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law
and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 648-52 (1996). And Claire Hill, for example,
explored literature about the incentive of attorneys to draft contracts that resemble
familiar and existing templates. See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in
“Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (2001) (suggesting that nervous junior associates
might prefer leaving boilerplate unaltered because “the form offers comfort”).
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Information can be gathered about partners in a variety of
manners. The very terms of a proposed deal provide one such
important source of information. These terms have an effect beyond
their direct content value (that is, their direct worth to a fully
informed recipient of the proposal). They additionally serve as
potential indicators regarding unknown attributes of the proposing
party. The athlete from Spier’s example45 solicits an injury clause
(that guarantees some salary in the event of an injury) because,
presumably, he would prefer compensation adjustment to selfinsurance. The content of this term, that is, its full-information
value, is negative for the recipient: it should compel an actuarial
downward wage adjustment by the employer to compensate for the
expected value of the insurance risk. But the proposed term has
another negative effect, as Spier explains, which emerges only when
the recipient is imperfectly informed. This is the negative signal
regarding the athlete’s privately known internal attributes and the
related likelihood that he will become injured.
To see the full potential effect of the proposal to deviate from the
default, consider the athlete example, but this time imagine a mirror
version of Spier’s hypothetical. Spier’s signaling account suggests
that while parties worry about terms that can generate negative
signals (such as requesting an injury clause when the default is for
exclusion of injury compensation), they should be more than willing
to opt out when the inferred information is positive. In Spier’s
example, because the default norm is for no injury insurance, an
athlete would be disinclined to propose a deviation from this default,
even if it were efficient, for fear of sending the adverse signal
regarding his fragility. But what about the reverse scenario, in which
the default arrangement or the norm is for the routine inclusion of
injury clauses? In such a circumstance, Spier’s signaling account
suggests that some athletes should be eager to send the reverse
signal. They would offer to waive the default injury clause so as to
signal positively to the prospective employer their unobservable
private attributes (that is, that they are especially hale), and they
should accordingly demand a higher wage, augmented at least by the
actuarial risk foregone by the employer relieved of such insurance
liability. Therefore, opting out of the default should be likely to occur
when the opt-out, as in this example, has positive direct content
value and is consistent with a positive signal.
The policy prescription that follows from this signaling reasoning
is to set default rules where positive signals, or at least no negative

45. Spier, supra note 22, at 433.
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signals, will result as natural inferences from opting out.46 Indeed,
building upon the asymmetric information-forcing effects of
competing default rules, Johnston claims that the Hadley v.
Baxendale default rule of limited carrier liability stifles opt-out by
shippers who fear the negative strategic consequences of seeking
higher liability coverage. But a reversal of the Hadley v. Baxendale
default rule—to a legal baseline of unlimited carrier liability—would
create an environment conducive to opt-outs, freeing shippers from
some of the strategic motives that would otherwise impair them from
private tailoring under the current rule.47
There is an additional factor, however, that renders more difficult
the task of setting default rules such that opt-out proposals will be
immune from negative signals. If, say, one default rule (“no injury
insurance”) generates a negative inference against parties who
propose to opt out of it, it does not follow that the opposite default
rule (“injury insurance”) will guarantee a positive inference. True, it
is possible that parties might interpret waiver of a default injury
clause positively (the athlete is injury-free), as Spier’s analysis
suggests.48 Indeed, the direct content value of the term should force,
other things being equal, an upward wage adjustment to compensate
for the employer’s reduced risk of not having to provide disability
insurance. But other things are not equal. A departure from the
“norm”—a proposal to incorporate terms that are not the standard,
default terms—may in and of itself raise suspicion. A negative
account can also be constructed for the proposed deviation,
notwithstanding its positive direct content value. Here, it could be
that the deviation of waiving an injury clause would cause the
employer to question the athlete’s commitment to the enterprise. (“Is
he not going to be giving his all in each match? Is that why he thinks
he will never be injured?”) It might even signal more generally to the
employer that the athlete is prone to hyper-negotiate his contract
and perhaps be the type of person who will hold out in future phases
of the relationship to expropriate a disproportionate share of any
surplus. As Bernstein notes, a proposal to tinker with the boilerplate
terms may signal legalistic attributes and even litigiousness.49 The
46. Ayres and Gertner argue that when the uninformed party can propose a “menu” of
contracts, the content of the default rule becomes irrelevant. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 30,
at 739-41. Under their framework, the problem of negative signals is muted since it is up to
the uninformed party to “screen” the information in a manner that does not leave the
informed parties the option of remaining silent and hiding their information. Id. at 739 n.33.
47. See Johnston, supra note 3, at 630. Presumably the current rule makes opt-out by
carriers easier because their offering unlimited liability could signal reliability. Indeed,
although a shipper likely has superior ex ante knowledge about the damages from breach
of the shipping contract, the carrier has superior knowledge about the likelihood of breach.
48. Spier, supra note 22, at 433.
49. Bernstein, supra note 18, at 71-72.

2006]

ON THE STICKINESS OF DEFAULT RULES

663

deviation is thus susceptible to more than one explanatory account,
and one or more of those accounts may well be negative.
That the deviant term can be reconciled with more than one
rationale does not mean that a negative version will necessarily
eclipse a positive one. The claim here is more modest: the presence of
a plausible positive explanation for a deviant term that should be
costed favorably on its direct content value by a rational actor does
not preclude the simultaneous existence of an alternative, less
positive account. This possibility of multifaceted interpretation
means that any recipient of a proposal can recast a term that is
facially favorable into one that carries, regardless of its objectively
positive content, an accompanying negative message about
unobserved characteristics of the proposer.
When a negative inference is plausible, it will provide a basis for a
negatively disposed recipient to rationalize the deviance adversely.
The degree of plausibility is, of course, relevant, because the more
intuitive the negative explanation, the stronger the negative
inference.50 In strong enough cases, the negative message could
conceivably outweigh the otherwise favorable value of a positive-cost
term to the recipient. For example, if the concern of the athlete’s noncommitment to the enterprise (even if never validly grounded)
overshadows the actuarial benefit to the recipient team that should
follow from waiving an injury clause, then the default injury clause
might stick, even when inefficient. Indeed, in settings in which
deviations are uncommon, it will become increasingly likely that the
recipient will be disposed to construct or select a negative account,
and hence default rules will be at their stickiest.
The inherent suspicion toward proposals to opt out may stem, as
Bernstein suggests, from the adverse messages about the deviating
party’s treatment of relational norms—that she will be unlikely to
resolve disputes in a collaborative and informal manner.51 Indeed, as
Alan Schwartz posits, it might cue that the proposer is hyperlitigious.52 It might even be a negative signal in the traditional

50. This may be related to the theory of “counterfactual reasoning,” where negative
events possibly cause subjects to relive those events counterfactually, altering the most
“mutable” characteristics, in feeling regret. Even positive events can trigger some
counterfactual thinking when negative events are “very close to occurring.” Korobkin,
supra note 12; see also text accompanying notes 93-108 (summarizing social psychological
literature). Thus, the more plausible a negative account is, the more likely a deviant term
is to trouble a recipient.
51. Bernstein, supra note 18, at 70-71.
52. Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An
Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 397 (1990); see also
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1581, 1586 (2005) (noting sellers would avoid consumers who attempted to negotiate
changes to a form contract due to fear of litigiousness).
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economic sense used by Spier: a visible proxy for a specifically
identified but unobservable attribute.53 Any of these explanations, of
course, may overlap with a black box cognitive bias of preferring the
status quo, as explored by Korobkin,54 or with a reluctance to forfeit
accrued network benefits from using standardized terms, as
discussed by Kahan and Klausner.55 But it could also be something
broader and more diffuse than any of these fairly particularized
grounds. It might be that parties’ disinclinations toward deviance
stem from a rudimentary fear of the unknown.
Pause to reflect on the commercial contracting setting. When a
party does not know her counterpart well, she must always consider
the risk of being exploited by an undesirable or opportunistic actor.
There is consequently added comfort when that counterpart plays
the game according to familiar patterns. Conversely, there is added
concern when the counterpart’s conduct is unfamiliar, different from
what is ordinarily done. The asymmetric information regarding the
counterpart’s attributes makes parties seek out clues to ascertain
these hidden traits, which are theoretically infinite in number, to
reduce the information disparity and minimize uncertainty.56
It is possible that these clues the parties seek out are both broader
and looser than what economists traditionally refer to as “signals.” In
a strict signaling account, the party who is less informed uses an
observation about the informed party’s conduct to make a rational
inference of the counterpart’s unobserved type. The recipient of a
proposal first identifies the unknown trait and then predicts that a
person of a given type will be more likely to make the proposal that
the counterpart made; the proposal is a signal for the unknown
trait.57 In military parlance, the signal serves as a proxy for a
“known” unknown: a situation in which the uninformed party knows
the domain (the “distribution”) of her ignorance.58
In the contracting setting, however, it is additionally possible that
the uninformed party does not even know what it is that she doesn’t
know; that is, the uninformed party may not be proactively seeking out
a signal to serve as a proxy for a specified but unobservable
characteristic. Rather, she may reactively regard a deviation from the
53. Spier, supra note 22, at 434.
54. See Korobkin, supra note 8, at 625-30.
55. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7.
56. Cf. Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why
Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 109-10 (2000) (predicting that transactors are
less suspicious of form contracts than highly tailored ones due to fears of the exploitation of
private information more possible in highly tailored ones).
57. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-20 (2000).
58. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld popularized the term “unknown
unknown” in 2002. See Press Conference, DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and
Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002.
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default as raising a red flag. It cues her to wake up and become
concerned, even without a lucid understanding of what the relevant
unknown characteristic worthy of concern is. She experiences fear of
the “unknown unknown.”59 Such a deviant proposal causes her to
think, “I don’t know what it is that I should know better about my
counterpart, but something doesn’t look right.” This fear of the
unknown may account for documented situations of contractual
parties becoming “spooked” by unconventional terms. For example, in
a study on Silicon Valley start-up ventures, Joseph Bankman found a
dearth of (tax-efficient) partnership structures and a plethora of (taxinefficient) stand-alone corporation structures.60 In offering an account
based on the ability of corporations to confer compensation through
the readily familiar tool of “stock options” (as opposed to partnerships’
less gainly tool of “partnership interests”), a surveyed venture
capitalist observed, “Management gets spooked by [the unfamiliar tool
of] partnership interests.”61 This led Bankman in turn to conclude, “in
an atmosphere of trust, it might take only a few hours to explain the
equivalence of corporate and partnership options or interests. In an
atmosphere of distrust, an employee might feel reluctant to accept any
explanation, however coherent.”62 Thus a prospective employee offered
partnership interests instead of stock options, even if told the reason
for doing so is tax-related, might nevertheless “get spooked” that such
exotica portend something wrong.63
The psychological underpinning for this suspicious tendency may
find its roots in the phenomenon known as “ambiguity aversion,” or
more formally, “source preference,” in the social psychology
literature.64 One strand of this research explores the degree to which
decisionmakers generally prefer “known” to “unknown” risks.65 As
broad generalization, when presented with a choice between flipping
a coin and having it land heads (p = 0.5) and drawing a red chip from
59. See id.
60. Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1737, 1738 (1994).
61. Id. at 1751.
62. Id. at 1752; see also Klausner, supra note 4, at 821 (postulating that Bankman’s
findings could be a manifestation of marketing externalities).
63. Another illustration of this might be in the diametric default rules concerning the
right to sue under the automobile insurance schemes in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
Default coverage seems to predominate in both jurisdictions. See Kahneman et al., supra
note 13, at 199.
64. See Craig R. Fox & Martin Weber, Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance,
and Decision Context, 88 ORGL. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 476, 478 (2002).
65. See, e.g., Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative
Ignorance, 110 Q. J. ECON. 585 (1995); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Variants of
Uncertainty, 11 COGNITION 143 (1982); J. Frank Yates & Lisa G. Zukowski,
Characterization of Ambiguity in Decision Making, 21 BEHAV. SCI. 19 (1976). Note that
Korobkin suggests that his “inertia theory” may, in fact, be predicated upon these
psychological trends. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1622-24.
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an urn with ten chips of which between three and seven are red (p =
0.5), subjects tend to prefer the known risk of the coin toss,
notwithstanding the equal probability of the chip draw, because it is
of equal risk but it is less “ambiguous.”66 In other words, the source of
its probability is more known. Secondary studies in this area explore
various refinements, including, among other factors, the ability to
mute the effect in noncomparative forced-choice environments,67 the
sensitivity of the effect to the probability level of the underlying
risk,68 and the framing effects of juxtaposing confidence-building and
conference-shaking heuristics.69
One of the dominant models explaining this behavior relies upon
the concept of “comparative ignorance,” whereby decisionmakers tend
to feel more anxious in situations where their adversaries (or even
experimenters) are perceived to have more knowledge or competence
in assessing the underlying risk probability.70 In a particularly
relevant study, the data suggest that subjects seek to avoid, with
increasing anxiety, situations in which the risk probability is known,
situations in which the risk probability is unknown and unknowable
by any party, and situations in which the risk is unknown but more
likely to be known by another party (that is, escalating comparative
ignorance).71 Considering these psychological findings, it could well be
that the proposal of an aberrational term unsettles the recipient, who
starts to focus on his comparative ignorance of the other party’s
internal attributes. (“Why did she propose that? Normal people don’t
put in that term. What is it about this person that I don’t know? What
is it about this deal that she knows but I don’t?”) The more jarring
(cognitively dissonant) the departure is from standard terms, the more
salient the trigger will be that invokes comparative ignorance
concerns. This is why the mere existence of a plausible negative
account to the deviance is more important than its ultimate
persuasiveness vis-à-vis a positive account; the existence of a negative
possible explanation fuels the fear of the unknown and sets the
recipient down a speculative path of worry regarding his counterpart’s
private information.72 While of course we do not seek to construct a
66. See Yates & Zukowski, supra note 65, at 20.
67. See Shawn P. Curley & J. Frank Yates, The Center and Range of the Probability
Interval as Factors Affecting Ambiguity Preferences, 36 ORGL. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 273 (1985).
68. See Fox & Weber, supra note 64.
69. See Bryan K. Church & Ping Zhang, Bargaining Behavior and Payoff Uncertainty:
Experimental Evidence, 20 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 407 (1999).
70. See Fox & Tversky, supra note 65, at 587-88.
71. See Clare Chua Chow & Rakesh K. Sarin, Known, Unknown, and Unknowable
Uncertainties, 52 THEORY & DECISION 127 (2002).
72. It is for this reason that if, by corollary, a deviation from the status quo can be
accompanied by a credible explanation, the proposer may defuse or at least minimize the
negative potential signal.
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formal psychological model within the scope of this Article, we do offer
this account as a further possible explanation for the ubiquity and
persistence of default stickiness and the seeming avoidance of
deviance in writing contracts.
Importantly, this negative disposition toward deviant terms is not
unique to default legal rules. A similar stickiness potentially exists
when the default arrangement is embodied in a business norm (for
example, cash on delivery) or in routine provisions of industry
boilerplate (for example, closing terms of standard-form residential
purchase and sale agreements).73 Indeed, notwithstanding the
presence of a default legal rule, a norm may emerge under which
transactors regularly opt out of the legal rule and create a stock
commercial term that is the opposite. In such situations, the
background norm, rather than the legal rule, would arguably become
the relevant “default.”74 For example, a default rule in shipping
contracts of consequential damages in the event of breach (the
Hadley rule) can be and often is readily reversed by a boilerplate
disclaimer of liability and nominal cap on damages.75 In such
situations, the stickiness likely applies with respect to the boilerplate
term, not the common law backdrop against which it was developed.
Thus the problem of stickiness may be even broader than a formal
conception of “legal” defaults might suggest.
This understanding of stickiness also suggests that the
frequency—and infrequency—of opting out will have a selfreinforcing quality. The less often opt-out happens, the more
empirically prevalent the background default becomes. The greater
empirical prevalence of the background rule will in turn increase the
suspicious nature of any specific instance of deviation, which further
in turn will weaken the incentive of any party to propose such a
deviation in the first place. Conversely, the more common it becomes
to propose opting out of a particular term, the less reason there will
be for the recipient of the proposal to be suspicious, and so the norm
73. In these situations, where the parties’ familiarity with the background
arrangement is acquired through experience, the negative inferences attributed to
deviance may be more severe. See Bernstein, supra note 18, at 70-71. But cf. Korobkin,
supra note 12, at 1603-05.
74. One of Korobkin’s experiments produced data that may be at odds with this
intuition, suggesting that parties’ status quo preference might be stronger to the
underlying legal default rule rather than the opposite commercial norm. See Korobkin,
supra note 12, at 1603-05. For reasons beyond the scope of this Article, methodological
constraints in Korobkin’s law student experiment may limit the generalizability of his
findings, and these ones especially. For a more detailed critique of Korobkin’s methodology,
see Guy Rub, The Grounds for the Stickiness of Contractual Default Rules 34-43 (Aug.
2004) (unpublished thesis) (on file with author).
75. Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of
Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 120-21 (1989) (noting the norm of limiting damages for
loss and delay in shipping contract forms).
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against private tailoring should weaken. In these latter situations,
not only will parties be less inclined to penalize the proposed opt-out
under consideration, but they also will be more amenable to having
discussions about the content of the underlying term itself. It will get
placed “on the table.” In other words, an equilibrium in which few if
any opt-outs occur is possible, but it is by no means unique. If some
parties “fluctuate,” by experimenting with deviant provisions, then
instances of deviation will become less rare and the suspicion against
them will subside.76 There may even be a critical mass threshold
depending on the term and the parties.
In this regard, one of the interesting results from Korobkin’s
status quo bias experiments are the data that he does not analyze.
Korobkin’s principal experimental design involves a hypothetical
bargaining over the terms of a delivery contract. In the relevant
baseline trial (Trial 1), he analyzes an impossibility excuse, that is, a
contractual term that releases the delivery service from liability for
breach if external circumstances make fulfillment of the contract
impossible.77 To test the presence of a status quo bias, Korobkin
assigns subjects to two conditions. In the first condition, subjects are
told that the default legal rule is for such an impossibility excuse and
asked how much the delivery service should demand to waive the
legal rule.78 In the second condition, subjects are told that there is no
impossibility excuse in default law and asked how much the delivery
service would pay to secure it.79 Strictly Coasian economic actors
should price the term the same way (to waive it if they have it by
default or to buy it if they do not), but Korobkin finds a status quo
bias based on the different mean prices between the two conditions
($188,000 in the first to waive and $56,000 in the second to buy, with
a p < 0.01).80
To explore further an “inertia theory” explanation, Korobkin
conducts Trial 2, in which he alters the experiments, telling subjects
in the first condition that while the default rule is for an
impossibility excuse, that rule is actually a new legal development
and that previously there was no such excuse (he does so to test the
effect of learning benefit externalities).81 In the second condition, he
reverses, with no impossibility excuse again being the default, but a
newly created one.82 He still finds “inertia” in the differing mean

76. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1605-08 (giving an example of a rapid shift from a
no-opt-out equilibrium to a common-opt-out equilibrium).
77. Id. at 1590-92.
78. Id. at 1591.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1591-92.
81. Id. at 1599-1600.
82. Id. at 1600.
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prices for waiving/buying the term ($139,000 versus $31,000, with a
p < 0.001).83 Moreover, in Trial 3 (to test the preference of legal rules
versus commercial norms), he makes the first condition that the
default legal rule is for an impossibility excuse but that there is a
routine commercial practice of waiving the rule, and the second
condition the reverse.84 Yet again, a “status quo bias” trend persists
in the mean prices ($63,000 versus $20,000, with a p < 0.05).85
Korobkin’s interesting studies focus on within trial differences
between conditions. What are more interesting for the present
analysis are the among trial differences across conditions. While we
do not have the data to analyze the variance, the falling price offers
of the first condition from Trial 1 to Trial 2 to Trial 3 ($188,000 to
$139,000 to $63,000) support the intuitions of this Article, namely,
that a norm that is less entrenched becomes more susceptible to
deviation and hence permits parties to exact less of a penalty for
alteration. In Trial 1, subjects were told of a default legal rule and
asked to deviate from it by waiver; they demanded a high price.86 In
Trial 2, they were told of a default legal rule, but that that rule was a
newly created one; they demanded less.87 In Trial 3, they were told
that the default “rule” was in name only and was systematically
departed from; they demanded still less.88 The default rule thus
became less sticky in strength as its “pedigree” diminished.89
In conclusion, if default rules are indeed stickier than previous
accounts suggest (as we believe), then there may be ramifications for
legal policymaking. For example, policymakers should arguably place
even more emphasis on setting accurate defaults, because departure
costs might be higher than previously thought. As for the effect on
penalty default rules, however, there are more complex
considerations. On the one hand, the premise that parties will easily
opt out of them to avoid the penalty may be more difficult to defend
when there is widespread stickiness that stifles tailoring. On the
other hand, harsh enough penalty defaults can overcome the
stickiness effect, and once that effect is overcome, the increased
prevalence of deviation will, in and of itself, attenuate the stickiness
of the default rule even further.90
83. Id. at 1601-02.
84. Id. at 1603-04.
85. Id. at 1604-05.
86. Id. at 1591.
87. Id. at 1599-1600.
88. Id. at 1603-04.
89. Similarly, in the second condition, the price fell from Trial 1 to Trial 2 to Trial 3
by $56,000 to $31,000 to $20,000. See id. at 1605 tbl.2.C.
90. Professor Klausner notes that legal “menus” of multiple options from which one
must be affirmatively selected can help overcome the power of “focal points” upon which
parties can fixate and become stuck. Klausner, supra note 4, at 800-01.
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Another policy implication of the stickiness conjecture has to do
with the design of standard forms. Many de facto default provisions
appear not in the Uniform Commercial Code or in industry
regulations but rather in boilerplate forms that are distributed by
trade groups and nonprofits to industry participants, often with no
charge.91 Once these circulated forms achieve enough popularity,
they may themselves become “sticky”; that is, it may be difficult to
adopt competing forms with different terms. This suggests that the
drafters of popular forms have more power than is perceived. They
can implement terms that are one-sided without leaving adversely
affected parties a realistic opportunity to opt out. Associations that
coordinate these forms may therefore create antitrust concerns even
if there are no apparent transaction costs to opting out of their forms.
Thus, the stickiness problem raises issues regarding the influence of
the organizations that draft standard forms. It may justify closer
social scrutiny of the terms they promulgate.92
IV. EXAMPLES
This Part identifies instances in which a default rule varies,
either across jurisdictions or over time. It argues that the absence of
noted differences in the degree of opt-out under these varying
circumstances provides evidence of stickiness.
A. Revocability of Offers
Before her offer has been accepted, an offeror may suffer a change
of heart. Market prices could change, she could receive better
proposals to deal, or she might discover something about the offeree.
Various reasons could underlie her desire to revoke. Under the
traditional common law, offers were historically revocable anytime
prior to acceptance.93 In fact, this rule was not even a default provision
from which the offeror could opt out: it was impossible to make
irrevocable offers by mere statement of intent. Under classic contract
law, a statement by the offeror that an offer was irrevocable for a
given length of time—the so-called firm offer—lacked legal effect.94

91. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2006).
92. This concern is separate from the political economy concerns of how these forms
are produced. Cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995).
93. Dickinson v. Dodds, (1876) 2 Ch.D. 463, 472 (Ch.).
94. See, e.g., Routledge v. Grant, (1828) 130 Eng. Rep. 920 (Bing.) (stating that a
promise to keep an offer open for a fixed period is not binding absent consideration by the
offeree). By corollary, a promise not to revoke supported by independent consideration was
enforceable as forming an independent contract unto itself.
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Modern common law gradually eroded the immutable revocability
rule. Likely recognizing that it may be in the interest of offerors to
issue irrevocable offers (and that it is surely in the interest of
offerees to receive irrevocable offers), the law came to permit offerors
to stipulate an offer’s irrevocability. Dispensing with the requirement
of independent consideration, the law’s reasoning shifted to focus on
reliance by the offeree, not economic consideration of the deal, to
justify allowing the promise not-to-revoke to become binding.95
Codifying this understanding, section 2-205 of the Uniform
Commercial Code enables merchants to make offers irrevocable for
up to three months.96 Thus, under Anglo-American law, revocability
is now a default rule, subject to virtually costless alteration. Offers
are revocable anytime prior to acceptance, but an offeror may opt out
of this default simply by stating that the offer is firm.
Other legal systems, however, have different revocability defaults.
In Germany, for example, the default rule is opposite from the AngloAmerican one (as it is in Switzerland, Portugal, and Brazil, to name
a few other places).97 Unless otherwise stated explicitly, offers are
irrevocable during the time in which the offeror may expect an
answer under ordinary circumstances, or for such other time as
specified in the offer.98 Again, this is only a default—opting out is
possible. Indeed, it is very simple. All an offeror needs to do to
recapture the power of revocation is add sufficiently clear language,
such as, “this offer is revocable at any time prior to its acceptance.”
Under the German practice, the use of terms like freibleibend
(“without engagement”) or widerruflich (“revocable”) would suffice to
reverse the irrevocability default and make the offer fully revocable.99

95. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760-61 (Cal. 1958); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of
Offers, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 271, 280-91.
96. U.C.C. section 2-205 states the following:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms give assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable
time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months . . . .
U.C.C. § 2-205 (2005); see also United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG), art. 16(2), Apr. 10, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9
(1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
97. See generally Franco Ferrari, A Comparative Overview of Offer and Acceptance
Inter Absentes, 10 B.U. INT’L L.J. 171, 188-91 (1992) (describing various legal systems’
solutions to revocability of offers); CASEBOOKS ON THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE:
CONTRACT LAW 200-06 (Hugh Beale et al. eds., 2002) (same).
98. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] §§ 145, 147(2), 148, translated in THE
GERMAN CIVIL CODE (Simon L. Goren trans., 1994); see also NIGEL G. FOSTER & SATISH
SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 384 (3d ed. 2002).
99. FOSTER & SULE, supra note 98, at 384; see also P.D.V. MARSH, COMPARATIVE
CONTRACT LAW: ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 63 (1994); BGB § 145 (“Whoever offers to
another to enter a contract is bound by the offer, unless he has excluded being so bound.”).
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Since it is impossible that both the Anglo-American revocability
rule and the German irrevocability rule are equally efficient (indeed,
they are diametrical), we should expect that opt-out will occur in one
of these jurisdictions more prevalently than the other. In fact, given
the polar nature of this rule (either revocable or not), we would
expect opting out to be commonplace in one of the countries, readily
detectible to the outside observer. This is especially so because the
direct costs of opting out—either adding a freibleibend recital in
Germany or signing on the firmness of the offer in the United
States—are practically zero.100 And yet, surprisingly, such prevalent
opt-out does not appear.101 In Germany, other than in discrete past
periods of severe economic trouble and hyperinflation during which
the freibleibend exception became for a time (unsurprisingly) widely
used, it has been uncommon for offerors to opt out of the
irrevocability default.102 German commentators do not find this result
surprising. They describe their practice of keeping offers irrevocable
as a “superior system.”103 As leading German comparativists note in
so concluding, “[E]xperience shows that [the irrevocability] results
are practical and equitable; the offeree can act with assurance in the
knowledge that his acceptance will bring about a contract.”104
Similarly, there is no detectably robust pattern of opt-out under
the Anglo-American revocability default. In general, offers are made
in a revocable, nonbinding fashion. Some limited empirical
scholarship explores this trend. One such study examines opt-out
practice within the construction industry. It finds that tendering
subcontractors do not opt into an irrevocability regime when making
their bids. Nor do general contractors request those bids to be

100. Benefits from defining the revocability term surely exist. Indeed, offer
irrevocability is one major type of precontractual liability. There is now a burgeoning body
of literature on the value of precontractual liability, both in terms of distribution effects
and in terms of efficiency. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar,
Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001); Richard Craswell, Offer,
Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996); Avery Katz, When Should
an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105
YALE L.J. 1249 (1996).
101. Proving that a specific practice does not exist is, of course, a difficult task. We
neither offer such proof nor intend to suggest that the opposite conclusion is unprovable.
We merely report our impression based on numerous informal conversations with
practitioners and European law professors, as well as a survey of the empirically oriented
literature.
102. See MARSH, supra note 99, at 63.
103. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 363 (Tony
Weir trans., 3d rev. ed., Clarendon Press 1998).
104. Id.; see CASEBOOKS ON THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE, supra note 97, at 205.
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irrevocable.105 Both subs and generals alike seem content with the
revocability default of their legal system.
To be sure, business negotiators often do use firm offers in the
course of a sales transaction in the United States, such that an offer
“on the table” may be deemed by section 2-205 of the Uniform
Commercial Code to be irrevocable. Indeed, one survey of general
counsels of large firms and conglomerates found that a majority both
make and receive firm offers regularly in their contracting
practices.106 The methodology in this study, however, is unfortunate,
because the respondents were expressly asked to consider as a firm
offer any “promise to buy or sell at a fixed price over a period of time .
. . not given in exchange for any promise or other payment by the
offeree.”107 Thus while such offers might have been technically
irrevocable in the eyes of the Code, we cannot be certain that the
respondents actually considered them irrevocable in any
meaningfully behavior-affecting manner. On the contrary, in other
parts of the same survey, these respondents indicated that even
binding promises were often jointly renegotiated.108 So it is not clear
that we have reliable data indicating an opt-out norm favoring firm
offers, even within the subset of large firms and conglomerates.
(Interestingly, even if we did read these data to indicate such a norm,
we see its prevalence vanish when we move from large conglomerates
to smaller firms.)109
The reluctance of parties to opt out of the revocability default can
be further evidenced when the default rules change over time within
a given jurisdiction. Such an example also exists in the specific
context of bid revocability. In this legal domain, an “interpretive
shock” occurred when a long-standing default rule of common law
was reversed regarding reliance upon an outstanding offer.110 The old
rule, usually illustrated by Judge Learned Hand’s decision in James
105. Richard Lewis, Contracts Between Businessmen: Reform of the Law of Firm Offers
and an Empirical Study of Tendering Practices in the Building Industry, 9 J.L. SOC’Y 153
(1982).
106. Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1, 26-28.
107. Id. at 26 (alteration in original).
108. See id. at 22-23; see also Note, Another Look at Construction Bidding and
Contracts at Formation, 53 VA. L. REV. 1720, 1734 (1967) (surveying offerors who
proclaimed “[o]ur word is our bond and our reputation paramount”).
109. Firms that reported using firm offers all had annual income exceeding $500
million. See Weintraub, supra note 106, at 27-28. Smaller firms did not report using firm
offers. Id. These results could show that with large firms the stakes of deals are larger and
more likely to offset any cost of altering defaults. Large firms are also more likely to have
credible reputations and hence get more mileage from making firm offers because the
offeree must rely on the offeror not to welch in ascribing value to the offer’s “firmness.”
110. This rule is related to, but conceptually distinct from, the revocability of an offer.
It does not alter the baseline revocability rights of an offeror; rather, it pertains to an
estoppel based upon (reasonable) counterparty reliance.
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Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,111 allowed a bidder to revoke its
(presumptively revocable) bid at any time before acceptance, even
after the recipient’s pre-acceptance reliance. This rule was effectively
abolished in 1958 by California Supreme Court Justice Traynor’s
decision in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.112 What happened to the
default norm after this interpretive shock? If post-reliance
revocability were efficient, we should have expected a contracting
shift back to the old status quo by express stipulations of revocability
in offers. Otherwise, if it were inefficient, we should have seen
prevalent opt-in prior to the Drennan decision. But we lack data to
suggest that anything actually changed after this decision in the way
parties solicited or submitted bids.113 To be sure, it is risky to draw
conclusions from this particular area of contracting since many of the
parties’ motivations are influenced by extralegal norms, reputation
bonds, and informal accommodations. Nevertheless, this appears to
be an illustration of the disinclination parties have to opt out of
defaults, even when those defaults change.
Some of the theories discussed earlier in this Article are
consistent with these observed patterns of opt-out infrequency. For
example, in some particular contexts the trend can probably be
explained by the parties’ adherence to informal norms that regulate
the legitimacy of revocation.114 But this explanation only goes so far.
When the legal default changes, it usually does not coincide with a
change in the norms of negotiations. Thus, we would expect opt-out
and a return to the old revocability default, the one that is consistent
with the parties’ expectations. It is also hard to imagine what
network benefits or interpretive advantages could explain this
default entrenchment. This is why we offer our further account as a
plausible explanation: deviating from the revocability default under
either regime may cause the offeree to suspect the value or the
111. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
112. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
113. Two studies from that era demonstrate an almost irrelevance of revocability law in
the construction industry. See Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of
Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 237, 259-61 (1952) (finding
that only half of general contractors even asked for firm offers from their subcontractors
notwithstanding it being in their obvious interest to do so and that even then many said they
would allow their subcontractors to back out of bids); Note, supra note 108, at 1733, 1739
(finding that the U.C.C. firm offer law had little relevance, as most sub bids to general
contractors were oral, and that bids that were written were not treated differently by the
generals; finding also that notwithstanding laxity toward firmness of sub offers, a strong
norm of reliance existed, with ninety-two percent of generals believing that subs should be
bound after reliance on their bids by the general). Note that the Chicago study found some
industry-specific trends: manufacturers of basic building materials worried about potential
firmness of written offers and expressly drafted their bids to preclude firmness. See Schultz,
supra, at 264. This could be explained by the risk of multiple parallel bids by such offerors
that could strain capacity if all were accepted.
114. See id.
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integrity of the deal by introducing a fear of the unknown. Against a
well entrenched backdrop of irrevocability, an offeror who explicitly
secures for herself the power to retract might be perceived as an
unreliable “fly-by-night,” one who might even retract from a finalized
agreement. Her commitment to the transaction could be questioned,
and with it, the willingness of the offeree to rely upon the offer and
pursue the deal. By contrast, against a rich backdrop of revocability,
an offeror who explicitly waives her power to revoke may not
necessarily enjoy the converse effects of perceived added reliability
and sense of commitment. Instead, the offeree might still construct
an unfavorable explanation. He might question whether the offeror
chose to confer an irrevocable option to him because the offeror had
no other potential partners knocking on the door. Or he might worry
that there were other market participants who became aware of
some problem with the offered deal or with the reputation of the
offeror. Since there are multiple dimensions of “unknowns,” it is
plausible that an uninformed offeree could make inferences along one
of the dimensions that yield a negative signal. Anticipating the
potential for the opt-out to provoke this negative inference, the
offeror is more likely to stick to the default practice.
B. The Duration of Employment Contracts
Another situation that reveals the stickiness of defaults is
employment contracting, or more specifically, the legal provisions
that govern the duration of the employment relationship in nonunion
labor agreements. In almost all jurisdictions in the United States,
the baseline common law default rule is employment at will,115 that
is, either party may terminate the relationship at any time, without
having to display a good cause for the termination act. Parties can of
course vary this default rule and enter into a more restrictive
arrangement that limits the set of causes that can give rise to
unilateral termination. Yet, other than in the union context, in which
collective bargaining agreements highly formalize the negotiations
process and subject it to a unique set of rules, such systematic opting
out does not seem to occur. On the contrary, in a survey-based study
published in 1995, J. Hoult Verkerke found that only fifteen percent
of nonunion employers opted out of employment at will by expressly
according just-cause protection in their employment contracts.116 To
115. Employment at will is the default rule in every American jurisdiction except
Montana, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -902
(West, Westlaw through 2005 Regular Sess.); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185(a) (2003); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (West, Westlaw through Acts 6644-6725 of 2004 Reg. and
Special Sess.); see also MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 300 (2002).
116. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment
Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 874-75; see also 2 THE
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reach this conclusion, Verkerke had to make broad generalizations
(for example, aggregate employment handbooks and express written
contracts together), but his data are nonetheless instructive on an
important American trend. Even more tellingly, one third of his
respondents used no contracting at all, relying solely upon default
common law and statutory rules to govern their employment
relationships.117
Within the category of “at-will” arrangements, however, U.S.
jurisdictions vary along a continuum of employee solicitude. That is,
although “employment at will remains the default rule for indefinite
term employment contracts,”118 Verkerke also finds that “[t]he
strength of the at will presumption varies substantially across
jurisdictions.”119 The presumption varies across jurisdictions because
states differ in their judicial opinions interpreting contract doctrines
such as good faith and implied contracts.120 Effectively, then, the atwill default rule exhibits some variance across states.
Verkerke compares two jurisdictions to see if employers in a more
“liberal” state, such as California, evince a greater pattern of opting
out of default common law by contract than employers in a “stricter”
state, such as Virginia.121 Assuming, for hypothesis only, that the
liberal rule is more efficient, he offered the following prediction:
Employers in California should, therefore, be inclined to
contract out of the state’s comparatively attractive default rule at
a lower rate than will Virginia employers. Virginia firms that fail
to contract receive that state’s stringent, and thus comparatively
unattractive, at will default. In contrast, California employers will
get a more relaxed version of the at will presumption that more
closely approximates the life-cycle just cause default.122

Verkerke’s data suggest that the predicted pattern of opting out
does not occur: there is no statistically significant relationship

NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 48-49 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
(discussing the at-will presumption and its erosion).
117. Verkerke, supra note 116, at 867. This finding seemed to correlate significantly
with firm size: the smaller employers relied on default law and avoided contracts
significantly more than their larger counterparts (almost half of them did not reduce their
employment relationships to writing). Conceivably this difference in contracting reflects
the heightened pinch of transaction costs for smaller firms.
118. Id. at 863.
119. Id. at 848. Most jurisdictions in Verkerke’s estimation have actually settled on
adopting “an intermediate approach.” Id.
120. Id. at 844.
121. Id. at 881. More specifically, Verkerke treated “more liberal” as following most
closely a just-cause animated “life cycle” rule in employment jurisprudence. Id. at 848-50.
122. Id. at 881. Verkerke expressly rejected an information-forcing “penalty” default
analysis in employment contracting. Id. at 885.
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between state and contractual choice.123 In both jurisdictions,
employers were sticking with no contracts about one-third of the
time. In other words, the content of the default rule did not seem to
goad Virginians to write employment contracts any more than
Californians.124 The status quo was thus highly sticky, even on a
matter of such seeming importance in the employment setting as the
dischargability of employees.125
Verkerke’s findings have been subsequently interpreted as an
illustration of asymmetric signaling, following the Spier/Johnston
accounts of stickiness. Invoking this explanation for the failure to opt
out of the default employment rules shown by Verkerke’s data,
Walter Kamiat contends that “an employee who seeks an enforceable
just-cause provision in the employment contract confronts a serious
signalling problem regarding the quality of the employee’s likely
work.”126 Again, a plausible negative account can be constructed to
explain the employee’s solicitation of just-cause protection in the
mind of the employer. (“Was she fired before? Does she predict
trouble with an at-will relationship?”) Anticipating that such a
conclusion might be drawn from his findings, however, Verkerke
dismisses signaling as an explanation in his analysis. He argues that
any signaling effect of seeking just-cause protection would likely be
symmetric.127 That is, if the signal of seeking a Pareto-optimal justcause dismissal provision conveys negative messages about the
seeking party’s prospective conduct under the contract (here, the
employee’s work ethic), then the response to the signal ought to
convey a similar and offsetting negative signal (here, the employer’s
stinginess in refusing to allow such an efficient just-cause provision).
Competitive market forces would permit the disappointed employee
to seek employment from another employer who offered, or at least
did not respond hostilely to, such a proposed just-cause term. Thus,
any negative signal from an employee seeking just cause would be
123. Although beyond the scope of this Article, Verkerke actually does find one
difference in his logit analysis for Michigan, id. at 881, and he offers a possible
explanation. Id. at 868.
124. Interestingly, Verkerke offers some crosstabulation data that could suggest a
normative preference for at will as opposed to just cause when examining the subset of
employers who did sink the transaction costs to write contracts in these two jurisdictions.
Id. at 881.
125. A signaling argument is indirectly supported by the frequency of just-cause
provisions in collective bargaining agreements. If the relative rarity of just-cause
contractual protection for nonunion employees is explained by the negative signal that a
request for such a term would send, then by corollary, the muting or masking of a signal
that is conveyed by a bargaining unit of a union rather than an exposed, individual
employee might explain why the term gets proposed (and accepted) more in the unionized
employee context.
126. Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market
and the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1958 (1996).
127. Verkerke, supra note 116, at 903.
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cancelled out, in Verkerke’s estimation, by the employer’s equally
negative signal by refusal to accede.
Even leaving aside assumptions regarding bargaining power, it is
not clear that a signaling explanation can be so easily dismissed. To
say that the signals cancel each other out misses somewhat the nature
of signaling effects. Rather than neutralizing each other, it is equally
plausible that the employee’s and the employer’s concerns about
negative inferences will compound one another in a vicious cycle, with
the employee worrying about the employer’s propensity to discharge
summarily by insisting on at will and the employer worrying about the
employee’s work ethic by insisting on just cause.128 Error can
sometimes accrue rather than cancel. Thus, regardless whether one
believes that Verkerke’s employment contracting pattern data tell a
story about negative signaling, they certainly do tell a story about
sticky defaults in the nonunion labor market.
Outside the United States, additional, more tentative evidence for
the stickiness of labor defaults can be marshaled. This is done by
considering a country, such as Canada, that has different labor
default rules. In contrast to the American legal baseline of
employment at will, Canada (at least in its most populous province of
Ontario) effectively employs a common law default of dismissal only
for cause.129 The Canadian experience is complicated somewhat by
the statutory overlay upon the common law of the Employment
Standards Act (ESA), which prescribes certain employee-protection
terms that cannot be waived by contract.130 Nevertheless, the overall
structure seems to be the reverse of the American system. To be sure,
describing the employment baseline in Canada as just cause is an
apt, but not perfect, analogy, because employers technically retain
ultimate discretion to terminate an employee’s job unilaterally for
any nondiscriminatory reason. But the just-cause rule can be seen as
the effective default in Canada, because notwithstanding their
nominal rights to dismiss an employee unilaterally, employers are
required to pay “termination” or “notice” payments if they choose to
dismiss an employee without just-cause.131 These default common
law termination entitlements of an employee may be raised or
lowered by contract as employers and employees see fit. The ESA,
128. Kamiat shares this critique of Verkerke’s conclusions. Kamiat, supra note 126, at
1962 n.15.
129. Employment Standards Act, S.O. 2000, ch. 41, § 54 (Can.), available at
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/DBLaws/Statutes/English/00e41_e.htm.
130. Id. § 5.
131. Id. § 61 (stating that an employee dismissed without notice and cause is entitled
to minimum payments under the common law). These payments vary widely and case-bycase, based upon factors such as duration of employment. See John-Paul Alexandrowicz, A
Comparative Analysis of the Law Regulating Employment Arbitration Agreements in the
United States and Canada, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1007, 1029-30 (2002).

2006]

ON THE STICKINESS OF DEFAULT RULES

679

however, sets a minimum level of termination benefits below which
private parties may not contract out, that is, a mandatory norm at
the lower extreme.132 Thus, although employees can contract out of
just-cause protection (or, more specifically, contract to waive their
termination entitlements at common law), their range of waiver gets
truncated by a statutory floor.133
As a generalization, then, it is fair to say that Canada follows the
reverse legal default from the United States: an effective rule of
termination for just cause. Being a default rule, employees are free to
request or agree to greater or fewer termination benefits as inclined.
If the American at-will rule were more efficient, one would expect
Canadian employees to offer and Canadian employers to seek
waivers of the just-cause protections to the maximal extent allowed
by the ESA in return for higher compensation.
Here, we were able to collect only anecdotal impressions from
Canadian labor lawyers, but they consistently suggest the same
trend of prevalent “noncontracting” that exists under the American
experience. In the words of one Canadian lawyer:
Although there is certainly a trend that we advise our
[employer] clients to try more to reduce employment conditions to
contract—and we are starting to see a bit more of that—the vast
majority don’t have any contracts at all—[they are] relying on the
statutory and common law entitlements. In fact, most ‘contracts’
for employment consist entirely of a one-page offer letter saying,
“Congratulations, please report to your first day of work on this
day at this pay.”134

Further consistent with the American data, the Canadian anecdotal
experience of labor lawyers is that if any trend exists, it is that
larger, more sophisticated companies are the most likely employers
to draft contracts for employment, with the smaller ones relying
upon default law.135
While it could, of course, be a comparative socio-legal
phenomenon—that the Canadians are simply “different” in their

132. See MCMILLAN BINCH MENDELSOHN, LLP, EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CANADA 4 (2004), http://
www.mcbinch.com/Upload/Publication/MBM_ACLF_Employment%20Law%20in%20Canada.pdf.
133. To be clear, though, all of these termination benefits in Canada are for dismissal
“without cause.” By contrast, if an employer meets a relatively stringent test for dismissal
“for cause,” then the notice benefits need not be paid under either the common law or the
ESA; they are effectively forfeited. See id. at 5-6. “Cause,” under the common law, is again
highly contextual and varies from employee to employee, depending on numerous factors.
See id. at 5.
134. Telephone Interview with Nadine Côté, Associate, Torys LLP, in Toronto, Can.
(Feb. 2, 2005).
135. Id.
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legal preferences from their American counterparts136—we just as
easily can conclude that there is an explanation finding its roots in
the reluctance to deviate from the standard legal default. Moreover,
it cannot simply be a story of transaction costs, because a one-page
letter in Canada can just as effortlessly become a one-and-a-quarterpage letter, with a further sentence setting by contract the
termination benefits. Yet, just as with the American experience, we
see a persistent stickiness of the default rule.
C. The Stickiness of Boilerplates
Another example of the stickiness phenomenon is found in the
drafting of boilerplates. Complex transactions are often governed by
industry-standard boilerplate terms, which vary little, if at all, across
contracts. What happens when the default interpretation of such a
boilerplate term changes, say, as a result of an external interpretive
shock? For example, what happens if an unexpected court ruling
interprets a standard term in a different (or, if possible, completely
opposite) way from the traditional understanding? Does the new
interpretation stick, or will parties redraft the boilerplate term to
return to the original intended meaning?
A recent example arose in the context of sovereign bond contracts,
as discussed in a working paper by Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati.137
Studying the restructuring consent terms of sovereign bond contracts
(the provisions that determine what fraction of the creditors must
approve a change in the credit terms), the authors identify a large
sector of the market that traditionally used one type of provision, a
“unanimous consent” clause.138 This clause requires, as its name
implies, the approval of all creditors for a workout refinancing. In a
landmark event in 2000, a sovereign debtor was able to modify a
contract with a unanimous consent clause without, in fact, acquiring
unanimous approval from the bondholders by invoking another
provision in the contract.139 This shocked the market—doubtless, it
136. There is actually some weak evidence for this. In the telephone interview of
Nadine Côté, Ms. Côté said that there is a “social justice” sense behind the minimum
employment standard for termination benefits under the ESA, and that the no-contractingout provision has been likened in case law to being similar to a prohibition against
contracting out of a speed limit: its absence would be flatly inconsistent with deep norms of
public policy. Id.
137. See G. Mitu Gulati & Stephen Choi, What Drives Changes in Boilerplate
Contracts (Oct. 28, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/
CentersAndPrograms/olin/papers/Fall%202004/Gulati.pdf [hereinafter Gulati & Choi,
Boilerplate Contracts]; see also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1129 (2006) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Contract as Statute].
138. See Gulati & Choi, Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 137, at 5.
139. See Choi & Gulati, Contract as Statute, supra note 137. The complementary
provision, known as “exit consent,” applied to early payment terms. The 2000 court
decision was an “interpretive shock” because it allowed the (non-unanimous) exit consent
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shocked the creditors who held unanimous consent clause bonds.140
Did the surprised creditors immediately insist upon amendments to
their bonds to shore up the unanimous consent protection that they
thought they had? Did issuers who drafted subsequent bonds revise
the language of the contract to clarify that unanimous consent is
required for modification?
No. Choi and Gulati found that, although many investors initially
grumbled about this new interpretation, there was no massive optout of the new default and no redrafting of the boilerplate language
in the contracts.141 The default text of the boilerplate remained the
same. The default, even when its legal content changed by deus ex
machina, remained sticky. The empirical tests conducted by Choi
and Gulati indicate that the use of the default boilerplate is “a
reflection of the standardized nature of such terms and the
‘stickiness’ inherent in changing such terms.”142 Specifically, they
argue that the lack of immediate shift back to the pre-shock
arrangement provides evidence for the stickiness hypothesis (or the
“lock-in” effect, as they call it in this context).143
Interestingly, Choi and Gulati also found a secondary effect:
although no country changed its boilerplate language initially, there
was, eventually, a follow-up effect, but only after three years. After
this substantial time lag, a renegade country, Mexico, went out on a
limb and altered the consent term to match expressly the meaning
that the court applied. This departure from the old boilerplate
language opened the floodgates, where other countries felt it was
acceptable, then, to redraft their consent clauses.144 This follow-up
provides support for the shifting nature of deviance costs mentioned
above. Once those costs are borne by “a pioneer,” future opt-outs
produce less anxiety as instances of deviance become familiar. In
such circumstances, the stickiness norm will erode and the
opportunity widens for innovation and surplus enhancement through
private legal tailoring.
V. CONCLUSION
Imagine the following scenario. You are looking to buy a new
component for your computer (say, a wireless router). You log onto
clause to override the unanimous consent clause. Gulati & Choi, Boilerplate Contracts,
supra note 137, at 2 n.3 (citing Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond
Trap, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2000, at 17) (describing Ecuador’s use of exit consents).
140. See Choi & Gulati, Contract as Statute, supra note 137.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Fall 2003, at 75.
143. Choi & Gulati, Contract as Statute, supra note 137.
144. Id.
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eBay and type the model number into the search bar. To your
delight, hundreds of items are auctioned. They are all very similar in
description and are sold by sellers of varying reputations. You are
getting ready to bid on one of these routers, the maximal value of
which to you is $50, when you notice that one of the offers is a bit
different. This offer is identical in every respect to the others—the
same router model, the same description, the same shipping costs—
but it includes an additional element. In a conspicuous fashion, the
seller announces that the winner of the auction will receive, apart
from the router, a handsome prize: a box of fancy chocolates. Indeed,
in the auction page, the seller includes a picture of chocolate. Will
you bid more than $50 for this auction? Will you bid less?
This Article posits that it is very plausible to expect that you will
bid less than $50, even if you like chocolate. True, the direct value of
this auction is increased by bundling the router with a non-zero
value chocolate.145 But there is also an indirect effect on the
valuation, which may be negative. You have never seen anything
before like this on eBay—nobody who sells computer parts bundles
them with chocolate. While the bundling itself does not provide any
direct indication that something might be wrong with the router, the
fact that this deviation is so uncommon may raise your suspicion
that the seller is trying to trick you, and other potential buyers, into
a transaction that you will later regret. The bundling of chocolate
into the transaction, being such an unfamiliar practice, may scare
you away by raising a host of “unknown” worries you had not
originally perceived. So while there is nothing wrong with such
bundling—in fact, it should increase the value of the sale to the
buyer—it may never be offered.
This same intuition underlies the thesis of this Article. It is
sometimes cheap and desirable to offer terms that differ from the
default rules or the standard terms used in the market. But the
proposal of new and otherwise unfamiliar terms may also raise
suspicions and scare away potential counterparties. Default rules
and the standard boilerplate terms may stick more than we think,
and more than they should.

145. We reject melting and other nuisance costs—that is another type of stickiness.

